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ABSTRACT
The Navy and Marine Corps provide key forward-presence, crisis response and
war-fighting capabilities to our nation's leaders and joint commanders. Naval Aviation
plays a central role in every naval mission.
Unfortunately, the tools of naval aviation's power, its aircraft, are becoming
alarmingly old. The average age of the naval aviation inventory is in excess of eighteen
years old. The nerve center of today's sophisticated aircraft, wiring, is also aging and in
some cases aging faster than the aircraft themselves. This study was initiated to
determine the state of aging aircraft wiring in naval aviation, explore emerging
technological solutions to support these systems as they age, and make a recommendation
for a course of action.
This thesis provides an overview of the aging wiring problem and performs an
analysis of possible technological solutions. Specifically, several prognostic and
diagnostic technologies exist in the field of aircraft wiring. This thesis will discuss and
evaluate these technologies in terms of ramifications, implementation, costs and benefits.
Simple cost and cost savings models for technology application will be formulated using
data from the Navy T-45 training program and commercial airlines to make a purchase
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In a world in which the United States has vital interests overseas, Navy and
Marine Corps forces provide key forward-presence, crisis response and war-fighting
capabilities to our nation's leaders and joint commanders. Naval Aviation plays a central
role in every naval mission, from establishing battlespace dominance to projecting power
ashore. Naval Aviation forces - aircraft carriers and aviation-capable amphibious ships
with their embarked air wings and aviation combat elements, land-based maritime patrol,
support aircraft and helicopters operating from surface combatants and auxiliary ships -
are the focal point of U.S. naval power.
It is with great concern that we point out that the Navy's aircraft are becoming
alarmingly old. The average age of the naval aviation inventory is in excess of eighteen
years and is now aging one year every year since few new aircraft are entering service.
The heart of today's aircraft fleet is its wiring. Wiring is also and in some cases aging
faster than the aircraft themselves. This study was initiated to determine the state of
aging aircraft wiring in naval aviation, explore emerging technological solutions to
support these systems as they age and make a recommendation for a course of action.
B. PURPOSE
This thesis provides naval aviation planners with current information rega din§
the state of prognostic and diagnostic technologies in the field of aircraft wiring. A cost
analysis of existing prognostic and diagnostic concepts will be performed and a
recommendation made for the purchase or non-purchase of available technolories.
C. SCOPE
This study will include: (1) an analysis of the aging aircraft and aging w. ag
problem in Naval Aviation, (2) a review of current operational tempo and requirements,
(3) an analysis of some current wiring prognostic and diagnostic technologies, (4) a
discussion of the costs and benefits of adopting various emerging prognostic and
diagnostic technology for today's aging systems.
D. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in researching this thesis consisted of on-site interviews
and correspondence with representatives of Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR),
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Delta Airlines, United Airlines,
the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program and private industry; various briefs; websites; CD-
Rom systems and professional papers. A brief review was conducted of current
operational tempo and conditions. Possible applications for current prognostic and
diagnostic systems to aging aircraft wiring systems were researched as well as costs
versus benefits.
E. ORGANIZATION
The reader now has been provided with the background, purpose, scope and
methodology for this thesis. The following chapters will flow as described in regards to
the scope and methodology. The study will be organized into the format depicted below.
I. Introduction
II. The Aging Aircraft Problem
III. Prognostic and Diagnostic Technologies
IV. Costs and Benefits
V. Conclusions And Recommendations
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
II. THE AGING AIRCRAFT PROBLEM
A. INTRODUCTION
The Navy currently operates over 2,100 aircraft that are over fifteen years old, 965
of which are more than twenty-five years old. Figure 1 displays the aging trend for the
aircraft fleet.
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Figure l Aircraft Average Age Trend From: Massenburg, 2000
Some aircraft such as the CH-53D and CH-46 are over 25 to 30 years old.
See statement of the Honorable Richard Healing, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Director,
Navy Safety and Survivability before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management Hearing on Aircraft Electrical System Safety, 5
October 2000.
With this old age come higher support costs in maintenance and manpower. Some
aircraft have replacements on the way, such as the F/A-l 8 E/F Super Hornet for the F-14
Tomcat and older F/A-l 8 C/D Hornets; the Boeing 737 for the C-9; the V-22 for the
Marine Corps H-53 and H-46; and the CH-60 for the Navy's H-46. Howeve: Tal
platforms do not have replacements currently planned. The EA-6B Prowler, S
Viking, E-2C Hawkeye and the P-3 Orion do not have replacements on the hon
Limiting or controlling aging impacts is critical for future mission accomplishmt
Even the platforms with replacements coming will be operational for several years lew
systems come into service.
The Air Force faces a similar problem. The Air Force Chief of Staff, General
Michael E. Ryan, claims that even if all modernization programs now planned are
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executed, the average age of the service's aircraft will reach 30 years old in 2019."
Even the airline industry is facing an aircraft age problem. Of the current
domestic passenger fleet, 40% of the aircraft have been in service for more than 20 years.
Since 1983, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has investigated at least
two-dozen incidents, including four with fatalities, in which aging wiring was cited as a
factor.
2
Mann, Paul, "Geriatric Ward," Aviation Week & Space Technology November 2000; 29.
House Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management Hearing on Aircraft
Electrical System Safety, 5 October 2000.
The new Chief ofNaval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, stated in recent
Congressional Hearings that the Navy is short by $ 1 7 billion annually and its "aviation
force is now the oldest it has ever been in history . . .Our cost models do not accurately
predict the true cost of operating our aviation assets... Until we have achieved a




The age of fleet aircraft coupled with limited new procurements require
significant maintenance/support levels and increased funding to maintain acceptable
readiness levels. The lack of ability to move funds/reinvest savings and overall
inadequate operations and maintenance, Navy (O&M, N) funding keep aircraft programs
from finding cost effective solutions. Life-cycle ownership costs growth needs to be
contained to enable modernization. This must be coupled with innovations in acquisition
and cycle time to field new systems. Strides have been taken to speed-up the acquisition
cycle but much improvement is still needed. Not only does aging aircraft promote higher
support costs and decrease readiness, but also reduces quality of life for fleet operators
and maintainers.
4
Mann, Paul, "Bush, Gore Promises Fall Short Of Desired Military Spending," Aviation
Week&SpaceTechnology 2 October 2000; 34-36.
B. ENVIRONMENT
Naval aviation performs its missions in various environments. Temperature
extremes, salt water, impacts/vibration and stress are the norm in air operations. First, an
Air Wing may deploy in the winter and operate in the cold over Bosnia or Kosovo and a
month later is in the heat of the Persian Gulf. Second, that Air Wing may then transit
through the Adriatic or Mediterranean and fly cold-weather operations, again all in the
span of a six-month deployment. These extremes extract a toll on today's systems.
C. OPERATIONAL TEMPO
In 1999 over 22 major naval operations were sustained, including Southern Watch
over Iraq. Over 71 naval exercises were accomplished with over 57 different countries.
At any one time up to six aircraft carriers and their respective Air Wings may be
underway. These underway periods may range from overseas deployments to
deployment work-ups to initial interoperability operations at the beginning of the inter-
deployment training cycle.
As Figure 2 shows, the readiness of our Carrier Air Wings has dropped
significantly in the past five fiscal years, especially during the critical training period of
the inter-deployment cycle.
Rear Admiral W.B. Massenburg, USN. "Maintaining Yesterday's Weapons for Tomorrow's
Warfighter," US Naval Air Systems Command 2000.
CARRIER AIRWING IDTC READINESS
by Fiscal Year of Deployment
The 'C1' through 'C4'
Ratings are notional
Days prior to Deployment Deployed
Data Dale: 31 OEC 99
Figure 2 IDTC Readiness From: Massenburg, 2000
The operational tempo has been very high, but the number of assets (ships and
planes) has shrunk and the remaining aircraft assets are aging rapidly. Little to no
thought was ever given to age limitations because most designers felt aircraft and related
systems would be replaced before age became an issue. Even aircraft that are relatively
young are being stressed to their limits. The F-18 community is expecting to spend $878
million over the next 12 years to conduct a service life extension (SLEP) program for 355
F/A-l 8 C/D aircraft. However, only enough funding has been identified to put 57 jets
through during the next seven years. We conclude the SLEP's are necessary because the
integrity of the aircraft is being worn down ahead of schedule due to unanticipated high
operational tempos. Overall naval aviation readiness trends are falling as Fl 3
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Figure 3 Readiness Trend From: Massenburg. 2000
Brown, David. "High op tempo stings Hornets-Pace of carrier takeoffs, landings takes a toll on C and D
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Figure 4 Maintenance Man Hour Trend From: Massenburg, 2000
In order to stop the skyrocketing cost of maintaining older aircraft, while
supporting current operational tempo, new and more effective ways to do maintenance
must be found. Effective Prognostic Health Management (PHM) systems and diagnostic
systems could streamline maintenance operations. PHM systems are devices and sensors
installed in aircraft that indicate when a component is going to fail before it does so.
Effective PHM would enable decision makers to optimally schedule more preventive
maintenance vice costly, reactive unscheduled maintenance. Effective diagnostic systems
could improve fault detection, location, repair and verification of repair while shortening
the time it takes to accomplish all these tasks.
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The Navy, Air Force, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), NASA and private
industry are attempting jointly to insert technology and improve maintenance/support
actions to address the aging aircraft dilemma. Various organizational and joint programs
such as the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy's (OS&TP) Wire
System Safety Interagency Working Group (WSSIWG), NAVAIR's Aging Aircraft IPT,
the Aircraft Wiring and Inert Gas Generator (AWIGG) working group, and the Naval Air
Vehicle Wiring Action Group (NAVWAG) have been formed. These groups
demonstrate the seriousness of the aging problem and the coordinated support of
government, industry and academia.
Various technologies have been developed that have the potential to improve the
safety of America's aircraft fleet, provided the requisite resources are made available to
assess their feasibility.
D. WIRING
Aircraft wiring has evolved from a nice-to-have item to the very lifeline of
modern aircraft. Today's aircraft can have up to several hundred miles worth of wiring
aboard. Flight controls, avionics, power plants, communications, weapon systems,
environmental and monitoring systems are all powered, interconnected and controlled by
wiring. One to two million man-hours per year are spent troubleshooting and repairing
wiring. Approximately 147,674 non-mission capable (NMC) hours per year and 1,077
mission aborts are attributed to wiring problems. Between July 1995 and December
12
1997 there were 64 in-flight electrical fires. Figure 5 illustrates wiring failure trends for
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Figure 5 Aircraft Wiring Failures From: NAVAIR 4.4.4, 2000
A significant amount of wiring on an aircraft may be inaccessible for inspection.
As aircraft age so does the wiring. In some cases the wiring ages faster than the airframe
due to its physical and chemical characteristics. Intrusive maintenance inspections of
wiring or other systems in close proximity lead to twisting, bending, pinching and general
trauma to aircraft wiring bundles and cause insulation abrasion during in-flight vibration.
Sean A. Field, Naval Air Systems Command, e-mail to the author, 17 November 2000.
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Spilled and leaked fluids, such as hydraulic fluid and salt water can eat wiring insulation.
Wire bundles also stretch and settle with age, and react with moisture and humidity. This
leads to polymer chain scission and loss of inherent mechanical and dialectic strength in
widely used polymide wire. Couple the complexities of wiring installations with the
harsh environment ofNaval Aviation and the now banned polyimide wiring, still in 51%
of aircraft, and the Navy faces a very serious problem. Wiring failure can ca e shock
hazards, electrical fires, loss of flight critical equipment, explosions, and damage or loss
of assets or personnel.
Polyimide insulated wire insulation was widely installed on aircraft in the 1970's
and early 1980's. This material was first thought to be ideal for aircraft wiring insulation
because of its light weight, thinness and high thermal stability. The problem, as was
found out later after installation in several platforms, is that it ages quickly in moist
environments, becomes brittle and prone to cracking. It is full of carbon that enables arc
tracking. Initially what happens is that moisture damaged polyimide insulation allows
tiny arcs to develop. These arcs don't trip circuit breakers or interrupt operation of the
respective systems, but it breaks down and carbonizes the insulation. This Carbon
conducts electricity and arc tracking occurs which can be explosive. Arc tracking in an
explosive environment could be catastrophic. This is what is believed to have happened
in the loss ofTWA 800 in July 1996 and Swissair flight 1 1 1 in September 1998. Aging
wire is also recognized as the cause of a cargo door separating from a United Airlines
flight in which nine people were killed. Polyimide insulation was phased out in 1980's in
14
production and repair of naval aircraft. The Navy also started a program to remove
polyimide wiring from critical areas and developed fire control systems to handle areas
where wiring could not be removed economically. The removal of polyimide insulated
wiring completely from the naval aircraft inventory would be too costly, manpower and
out-of-service time prohibitive.
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation of wiring on TWA
800 and inspections of older aircraft have led to findings that a need exists for (1)
improved maintenance practices, (2) better training for maintenance personnel and FAA
inspectors, and (3) new technologies for detecting and preventing problems with aircraft
wiring.
In light of the TWA 800 and Swissair disasters, the FAA, as a member of the
Aging Systems Task Force (ASTF) with airlines and aircraft manufacturers did a non-
intrusive inspection that looked at 70 aircraft of eight different models. The inspection
was purely visual inspections that could detect only physically observable faults. On
average, four to five discrepancies were found per aircraft type. Discrepancies were
found on multiple aircraft within a type so the average per individual aircraft was higher.
However, this inspection was done the same way most programmed wiring
inspections are done, visually. Even the best technician can't detect microscopic cracks
in wiring insulation that could become a concern.
See Statement of Alexis M. Stefani, Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, U.S. Department of
Transportation before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Emergency Management Hearing on Electrical System Safety, 5 October 2000.
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A recent inspection ofNavy P-3 aircraft indicated 25% of wire discrepancies
were found. Other inspections completed by Navy wiring inspectors have indicated up to
75% of all discrepancies can be detected visually. However, it doesn't matter what the
exact amounts of defects are observable visually since a great deal of wiring is
unobservable due to where it is installed and lack of access. Useful non-destructive tools
9
must be made available to accurately detect defaults and gather useful information.
Nomenclature Supports DMMH NMCM NMCS PMCM
MAINTENANCE INSPECTIONS
EA-6B $49,769,753 710,780 247,561 704
F/A-18 $99,781,092 1,428,159 820,787 1,037 25
H-60 $50,548,352 724,328 329,022 276
Table 1 INSPECTION COSTS From: Katzberg, 2000
We must work smarter not harder in our inspection process. Inspections comprise
io
.
the biggest percentage of cost for fleet maintenance. Table 1 displays the key indicators
of inspection support costs, Direct Maintenance Man Hours (DMMH), Non-Mission
Capable Maintenance (NMCM) hours, Non-Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) hours and
Ed Taylor, Jim Shaw and Bob Ernst, Correlation of Environment and Age Effects on Aircraft Wiring, 22
September 1999.
10
Bob Katzberg, Naval Air Systems Command 2000.
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Partial-Mission Capable Maintenance (PMCM) hours for the EA-6B, F/A-18 and H-60
(HS & HSL) communities for the period December 1998 to May 2000.
Another major problem is the lack of accurate wiring discrepancy data collection.
Current reporting systems, military and commercial, are not geared toward reporting
problems with wiring. Aging wire discrepancy trend analysis is inadequate because most
wiring faults are not recorded as "wiring gripes" but as discrepancies to the parent
system. For example, an aircraft may have had serious wiring problems between a power
supply and sensors/displays of the navigational system but for recording purposes the
fault detection and repair is documented under the navigation system and not wiring. A
traceable sub-classification, which assists in trend analysis or hazard identification, and
greater training/re-education of documenting wiring gripes is needed to help decision-
makers, program managers and engineers really know how the aging wiring is
performing.
Wiring troubleshooting is very manpower intensive and time consuming. The
primary troubleshooting method is still a technician with a voltmeter and a flashlight.
Advances in avionics systems, such as Built-in-Test (BIT) have hampered or even misled
technicians if faults turn out to be in system wiring.
17
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
18
III. PROGNOSTIC AND DIAGNOSTIC TECHNOLOGIES
A. PROGNOSTIC HEALTH MANAGEMENT (PHM)
Prognostic Health Management (PHM) is as concept whereby technology such as
sensors, are imbedded in a system that provides the operator and maintainer critical
information. This information would include current malfunctions and most importantly
indications of future failure or malfunctions.
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program defines on-aircraft PHM as a combination
of Micro Electro-Mechanical System (MEMS) and Micro-Electro-Optical Systems
(MEOS) with prognostic microprocessors to sense, detect, consider, prognoses, message
and perhaps correct problems.
The JSF program's goal is PHM that enables their logistics system. This system
enables PHM and other system status units to transmit health and status information to
support sites via data links. The goal is to eliminate ground support test equipment by
moving test and diagnostic systems onboard the aircraft to detect, diagnose and isolate
failures. JSF believes onboard PHM systems would be more effective in reducing
"cannot duplicate" test results that occur often with ground-based (non-flight
troubleshooting tests.) The Autonomous Logistics system even enables these onboard
Blemel, Kenneth G.; Dynamic Autonomous Test Systems for Prognostic Health Management, Joint
Strike Fighter Program Office, Arlington, VA. 1998.
19
systems to order parts, through the Joint Distributed Information System (JDIS) network,
and initiate maintenance action requests during the course of a flight.
Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) is the use of detection devices to monitor
system and subsystem components status and combine this status with computer
algorithms to calculate reliable estimates of "remaining useful life." This enables real-
time decisions to be made that shorten or extend time between overhaul or replacement.
This would replace the current system of overhaul or replacement at a given number of
hours, landings, days, starts, etc. Therefore, a replacement or overhaul decision is based
on actual type of usage. Various automobile manufacturers use this concept. The Navy
rotary-wing community is implementing CBM for various systems, especially for
vibration analysis. JSF would like to combine PHM with CBM through autonomous
logistics to eliminate scheduled maintenance.
After discussions with engineers at the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) that work on the JSF program, it is clear that onboard PHM is a viable
concept. However, it is recognized as feasible and being adopted for structural members,
powerplants and select avionics, but not for wiring.
B. SMART WIRE
The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) is working on a concept called
"Smart Wire." Their definition of Smart Wire is embedded intelligence and sensors in
12
Interview with William J. Scheuren, Leo Fila, Kimberly Becker, 8 August 2000.
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the wiring system to manage the health of wiring. This is basically as close to true PHM
the Navy can get for existing legacy systems. Smart Wire is intended to be a tool to
provide diagnostic and prognostic capabilities plus document the current condition of an
aircraft wiring system on a Bureau Number (BuNo) basis. This "health" tracking system
is intended to provide the capability to be proactive in fixing wire failures by addressing
them during planned maintenance.
Smart Wire would also be managed similarly to a component such as an engine or
Line Replacement Units (LRU). This could target certain aircraft for future upgrades or
overhaul based on traceable data.
The Smart Wire program will also make the effort to work with other programs
such as the Naval Sea Systems Command's (NAVSEA) DDG-51, DD21, CVX and
NSSN programs, as well as other government agencies such as the FAA, USAF, NASA,
Army and Department of Energy: and other entities such as commercial airlines,
automotive industry, nuclear power plants, and other industrial applications.
C. ARC FAULT CIRCUIT BREAKER (AFCB)
Power wiring is protected by circuit breakers that detect continuous short circuits
and overloads. However, arcing faults (discussed in chapter two) with their intermittent
nature and lower peak currents characteristics are not detected by current conventional
circuit breakers. NAVAIR, the FAA, and the Office ofNaval Research (ONR) have a
joint program to develop arc fault circuit breakers for aircraft use.
21
Arc fault detecting circuit breakers are currently available commerciL >r
residential and commercial use. This existing technology is a strong candidate
-ipid
development and application to aviation.
Arc faults are intermittent short circuits, which draw far less current than the
traditional bolted short circuit in addition to lacking the duration of an overloaded circuit.
Arc faults will not trip the conventional circuit breakers because of their low current, and
short duration nature.
Current visual inspection methods are the primary means to detect degradations in
installed wiring. Due to the inherent limitations of visual inspection oversights and lack
of access to some wiring, other inspection techniques should be developed. However, all
inspections are periodic in nature and therefore do not provide constant coverage. Arc
fault circuit breaker technology is not a substitute for preventive, programmed
maintenance, but it provides protection against arc faults.
Arc fault circuit breakers not only sense arcing faults, but also have the thermal
trip capabilities of current conventional circuit breakers. Arc faults are an issue in home
use as well. In 2002, the National Electric Code will require arc fault circuit breakers in
new home construction. 14 The home environment is very docile compared with naval
aircraft use and operating environments. However, as of late most homes and naval
aircraft share a common thread: old age.
Sean A. Field, Naval Air Systems Command, e-mail to the author, 17 November 2000.
Singer, Charles, Pappas, Robert; Arc Fault Detecting Circuit Breaker for Aging Commercial and
Military Transport Aircraft, Naval Air Systems Command, Federal Aviation Administration, 2000.
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Of course a home use arc fault circuit breaker cannot be simply installed on an
aircraft. The arc fault circuitry must be changed. The size of current arc fault circuit
breakers must also be reduced by at least 50%.
Safety is the number one priority of introducing arc fault circuit breakers but other
benefits could include troubleshooting and repair time reduction, cost reduction and
promotion of further innovation.
Arcing is only one symptom of aging wiring. However, arc fault circuit breakers
can effectively reduce the risk of arcing and its subsequent damage. Arc fault circuit
breakers must be affordable and easily retrofittable into the existing fleet.
According to the NAVAIR Aging Aircraft Integrated Process Team (IPT), arc
fault circuit breakers could reduce wiring maintenance time by 30 percent, reduce in-
flight fires by 80 percent and provide an annual savings of $12 million. At this time
introduction is tentatively scheduled for fiscal year 2005. Boeing is also working on
AFCB technology and plans limited production in 2001 and a "full family" of arc fault
circuit breakers by 2002.
D. DIAGNOSTICS
Diagnostics differs from prognostics in that it is more testing in nature and an
identification of a fault by examination or analysis where prognostic is more of a
prediction of future fault. Investment in diagnostic technology is a very feasible option at
See Statement of Alexis M. Stefani, Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, U.S. Department of
Transportation before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Emergency Management Hearing on Electrical System Safety, 5 October 2000.
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this time. It is also less intrusive and viable for legacy systems. Utilizing and investing
in more efficient diagnostic systems place the proper tools in the hands of those who need
them: fleet maintainers. More effective diagnostic systems can assist technicians and
maintenance decision-makers in maintaining the aging systems that exist today.
The Department of Defense (DOD), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
NASA, airline, corporate and general aviation communities are all looking for better
diagnostic systems to maintain aging aircraft including through joint programs.
Techniques to find defects in cables such as coaxial cable are relatively mature, using
Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR) and Standing Wave Reclectometry (SWR). There
have been past efforts to expand these techniques to other types of wire and cabling, but
not any industry-wide reason to do so. However, recent attention and concern for aging
aircraft systems has caused a greater effort toward degradation-detection in aviation
wiring systems.
NASA has one of the ultimate aging aerospace vehicles, the Space Shuttle. The
shuttle wiring system is highly complex, subject to wearing extremes and age. It is very
difficult to prosecute wiring problems on the Shuttle. Decreased confidence in Shuttle
wiring integrity leads to a great deal of manual inspection and troubleshooting, which in
turn leads to increased down time. NASA has recognized that any technology that
identifies a future fault or localizes an existing one accurately, could lead to significant
24
cost savings in time and labor. It is believed the cost of deploying such technology is
justified by increased safety. 16
One of the emerging technological innovations becoming available is a hand-held
Standing Wave Reclectometer (SWR), being developed and distributed by Eclypse
International Corporation of Corona, California. Eclypse's SWR is based on a prototype
design and patent by NASA at the Kennedy Space Center, Florida. The SWR (pictured
below) was developed to provide a portable, reliable device to verify the condition of
electrical power and signal distribution systems. Eclypse International has exclusive
rights to the patent for SWR.
Figure 6 Standing Wave Reflectometer
16NASA Ames Research Center, Wiring Integrity Research (WIRe) Pilot Study, 25 August 2000.
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The SWR is best described as an Impedance Based Cable Tester. Impec. nee
measure of the total opposition to current flow in a circuit The SWR is attached onl;
one end of a conductor. It sends a spectrum of frequenc vn the conductor, and
depends on a reflection of a portion of the signal from fee he c . ductnr, which
result in a change in impedance. By examining the frequei frequencies at which a
standing wave occurs, the fault feature can be located. 17
The Eclypse SWR is a hand-hand, battery-powered te w ith a range of 1 ,000
feet and short or open circuit detection accuracy of 0.2 percent :h equates to mere
centimeters. The SWR has a alphanumeric disp' keypad, rec : :eable battery v ,i a
8-hour operating life, auto shut-off, illuminated . lay and ke ud, serial data port,
drip/splash proof and shock resistant case and ar .-rating range of-20 to +60 degrees
Celsius. It is menu driven and has ten programn e setting for various conductor
types.
18
A typical problem NASA has found in its current conventional troubleshooting
environment is that troubleshooting personnel often have to disconnect several cables to
ensure they are not a source of a problem. These cables are often wire bundles and
difficult to access. When the wire bundle is disconnected, all systems with a wire passing
through the bundle must be retested when reconnected. This validation process takes a
great deal of time and manpower on systems unrelated to the discrepancy. The SWR cuts
17 NASA Ames Research Center, Wiring Integrity Research (WIRe) Pilot Study, 25 August 2000.
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this process by being non-intrusive and highly accurate in fault detection. The SWR also
cuts the time to validate the repair of the faulty system.
The overall benefits of SWR are reduced time and effort to troubleshoot, repair
and validate repairs; enable proactive maintenance and most of all, lower total operating
cost.
An advantage ofSWR for the military is the architecture of wiring in most
aircraft. U.S. military aircraft facilitate troubleshooting as most wiring harnesses feature
connectors. Unlike the military, commercial aircraft do not feature as many disconnects.
The prevalent practice in the commercial community is wire splices. Wire splices if done
well can be as reliable as connectors and save weight. However, once spliced, wires are
not as readily accessible for testing. Splicing also causes more differences in
configurations form aircraft to aircraft even of the same type.
Another technique for non-intrusively troubleshooting wiring and checking
continuity is Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR). In TDR, a pulse is sent down the
conductor. Anything along that conductor that changes impedance (changes in
resistance, capacitance or inductance) will reflect some energy back along the conductor.
However, the changes seen depend on sensitivity of the TDR instrument, careful
measurements and interpretation of data. NASA found that TDR is not feasible for
18 NASA Commercial Technology Team, "NASA Success Story," online posting, 16 November 2000,
<http://technology.nasa.gov/scripts/nls_ax.dIl/w3Succltem(2047).
19
Huey, Erik C, "Military Approach to Electrical Fault Detection Going Commercial", Air Safety Week,
16 February 1998. 4-5.
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detecting cable faults in the Space Shuttle. They found that faults a few meters or less
from the injection point ofTDR are not detected due to the extremely short travel time
(e.g. a few nanoseconds) of the TDR high frequency pulse.20
The SWR tester can provide the distance to and accurate nature of a discontinuity
in an electrical cable, without removal of the cable from the circuitry to which it is
connected. The SWR's simple design results in a tester less expensive to manufacture
than a typical TDR device. The SWR tester also promotes efficient utility with its
1
portability, selectable frequency range and automatic operation.
SWR is recognized as a means of localizing and identifying hard faults.
However, it is not currently able to locate defects in wiring insulation, but the technology
could be adapted to do so.22 The ultimate technology could find hard faults as it does
now, diagnose the health of wiring insulation and prognosticate the remaining lifetime of
wiring insulation. Companies such as Boeing believe a different application of the
technology used in SWR can be used to find insulation degradation with broad band
impedance spectroscopy.
NASA Ames Research Center, Wiring Integrity Research (WIRe) Pilot Study, 25 August 2000.
21US Patent & Trademark Office, "Non-intrusive Impedance-based Cable Tester," online posting, 2
November 1999, <http://164.195.1001 1/>
22 NASA Ames Research Center, Wiring Integrity Research (WIRe) Pilot Study, 25 August 2000.
23 Rogovin, Daniel, Mitchell, Ed, Fourth Joint DoD/FAA/NASA Conference on Aging Aircraft, May 1 5-
18, 2000: Wiring Insulation Health Monitoring Via Impedance Spectroscopy St. Louis, Missouri, 2000.
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IV. COSTS AND BENEFITS
A. INTRODUCTION
Unfortunately, in today's budget environment DOD cannot afford to pursue every
concept to battle aging aircraft wiring systems. The primary concepts discussed in this
thesis include Prognostic Health Management (PHM), Arc Fault Circuit Breaker (AFCB),
Smart Wire and the Standing Wave Reflectometer (SWR). This chapter will analyze
some costs and benefits using basic examples.
B. STANDING WAVE REFLECTOMETRY
To analyze the SWR system a generic scenario should be established. This
scenario involves an average prosecution of a wiring fault. A two-hour timeframe is
assumed as the average length to prosecute a wiring fault including set-up,
troubleshooting, repair and validation of the repair. Figure 7 displays the segment
breakdown of the two-hour period. Wiring faults can take anywhere from minutes to



















Figure 7 Current Wiring Fault Prosecution
The wiring related faults data utilized is from the Navy T-45 community.
Appendix (A) displays all T-45 wiring related faults per system as well as the Non-
Mission Capable hours and Non-Mission Capable Maintenance Unscheduled (NMCMU)
time in hours. The total NMCMU time of 8,443.4 hours is the primary concern and the
figure used for our computations. The period covered is 01 June 1999 to 30 June 2000,
and the data is for an average fleet of 1 02 aircraft in that period. The number of
technicians used per prosecution of a fault is two. The cost per hour, per technician is
$35.00. Since the T-45 program uses contract maintenance personnel, exact cost per
hour, per technician can be ascertained. Unfortunately, applying this model to fleet
technicians could be much more difficult. During the research for this thesis, estimated
organizational labor rates for fleet personnel ranged from $1 8 to $70 per hour were found.
The exact figure has not been determined at this time.
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Figure 7 displayed the breakdown for troubleshooting (including set-up), repair
and validation of repair in a two-hour wiring fault prosecution. Figure 8 below displays
what the new timeline could be ifSWR technology is utilized. The SWR technology

















Figure 8 SWR Wiring Fault Prosecution
The time decrease using SWR is 120 minutes (2 hours) to 35 minutes. This
represents a 71% reduction in time. By reducing 8,443.4 NMCMU hours by 71%, the
result is 2,448.6 hours. The original labor cost was $591,038 (8,443.4 hours x 2
technicians x $35 per hour). The new labor cost with SWR is $171,402 (2,448.6 hours x
2 technicians x $35). The labor cost savings this could mean to the T-45 community is
approximately $420,000 per year.
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Some factors should be mentioned here: 1) not all wiring faults are It
wiring faults but to the parent system as mentioned previously and; 2) the : i
a jet but also a basic trainer, and as such, less complex than a fleet aircraft lik^ <.^e 1
18.
Appendices (B) and (C) display comparable wiring fault data for the F// 8
EA-6B communities such as Direct Maintenance Man-Hours (D 1MH), Non-M: o;
Capable Maintenance (NMCM), Non-Mission Capable Supply IMCS), Partial Miss
Capable Maintenance (PMCM) and Partial Mission Capable Supp Cr 1CS) in hours
the period December 1998 to May 2000. The average number of tec... s to prose
these wiring faults and the per hour labor rate are not known. However, ng a
'
reduction to the total ofNMCM hours for the F/A-18 community leads to a io^
from 79,222 to 22,974 NMCM hours in an 1 8-month period. Another way tc ress the
time saved is if the T-45 model of two maintenance personnel at $35 per hour is applied
to the F/A-18 example. A savings of $3,937,360 ((79,222 x 35 x 2)-(22,974 x 35 x 2))
would be realized. The EA-6B community reduction of 71% equates to a reduction from
51,048 to 14,804 hours in an 18-month period. Using the T-45 model, this realizes a
savings of $2,537,080 ((51,048 x 35 x 2)-(14,804 x 35 x 2)). The bottom line however,
is that with less "down" time for maintenance means more aircraft availability for flight
time and training.
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An important factor that should be mentioned for the F/A-18 and EA-6B
example as in the T-45 one: not all wiring faults are reported as wiring faults but to the
parent system as mentioned previously.
The maintenance time savings ofSWR would be realized at all three levels of
maintenance. A major problem with the current prosecution of wiring faults is
misdiagnosis. Items such as Aviation Depot Level Repairables (AVDLR) and other
system components are often misdiagnosed as the problem when often it is a wiring
failure. These components are often sent to the intermediate maintenance level or even
depot level for repair when there is nothing wrong with them. SWR provides a means for
accurate diagnosis. It is beyond the scope of this thesis, but time savings would be
realized at not only the organizational level but all three levels of maintenance.
A secondary effect of accurate diagnosis is accurate demand data on the supply
system. If good components are being pulled from aircraft, demand for replacement parts
are being made on the supply system. Accurate diagnosis would help eliminate
unnecessary supply demands on an already stressed supply system.
Another un-quantifiable item for fleet aircraft, like the labor note previously
discussed, is how much it costs the Navy when an aircraft is Non-Mission Capable
(NMC) by the fact of not being available. The training aircraft community cannot
quantify this loss of availability either even with their strict training syllabus. Too many
factors would be involved to quantify based on aircraft type, missed aircrew training, type
of mission missed, and ability to make-up or divert missions to other assets. However,
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one aviation community, the airlines, can accurately identify what a Non-Mission
Capable aircraft means to them. Aircraft in the airline industry are revenue producers,
and as such have direct quantifiable cost associated when unavailable. Based on
information from major airlines, some dollar figures can be applied to the T-45 model. A
figure from one major airline is $59,000 as the dollar amount associated with an
unavailable aircraft per day with an average daily utilization rate of 8.7 hours. Other
airline figures are similar. Since some passengers and cargo can be diverted to other
aircraft, a figure of $40,000 is used for cost analysis by Delta Air Lines.24 Military
missions could also be subjected to schedule flexibility, but perhaps not as much as in the
airline community. For example, one airline could divert cargo and passengers to another
airline. $59,000 will be applied to the T-45 data in this example. The airline utilization
rate is higher than the average military aircraft. Using a 4.0 utilization rate, (less than
half of the airline utilization figure of 8.7 hours per day) the loss per hour down is
$14,750 ($59,000/4.0). The loss per hour ($14,750) multiplied by the number of hours
down for unscheduled maintenance in the year (8443.4) equates to a total loss per year of
$124,540,150. Using SWR could reduce the loss to $36,1 16,850 ($14,750 x 2,448.6), a
difference of $88,423,300. The loss for the Navy is obviously not revenue but
opportunity cost of having the aircraft more available for use. What is demonstrated
above is this opportunity cost with a dollar figure applied to it.
24
Hemdon, Tim, Delta Airlines, e-mail to the author, 28 August 2000.
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The unit cost for an SWR unit is $5,500. The total buy-in amount for just the
SWR units to the entire 4,050 aircraft currently in the fleet and pipeline at one per every
five aircraft is $4.5 million. The number to buy per aircraft or squadron may depend on
the deployment and detachment policies of each community. For example, a squadron
that keeps most of its aircraft together or in limited detachment modes may only need two
or three SWR's, but a detachment-intense unit such as a helicopter squadron may require
more units.
SWR provides a powerful tool to combat aging wiring. Studies are also being
conducted to combine SWR with NAVAIR tool databases to affect even the repair
segment of the fault prosecution timeline, by informing the technician what tools to use to
fix the fault.
It is not intended to imply the time saved with SWR translates into manpower
reductions for the fleet. Given the nature of aging systems; expanding mission areas;
reduced assets; weak retention and recruitment; and the constant reduction of "fair share"
manning compared to Billets Authorized (BA) per squadron, adequate manning levels are
absolutely necessary. SWR provides the front-line technician to work smarter, not
harder. This concept and many others are being supported through programs like the
Chief ofNaval Operation's (N88) "Smart Squadron" program.
C. PROGNOSTIC HEALTH MANAGEMENT
As mentioned before, the DOD's current cutting edge aircraft in the testing stage
is the Joint Strike Fighter and PHM for wiring wasn't considered mature enough for its
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autonomous logistics system. If true PHM is not available for new production aircraft it
cannot be realistically considered for legacy systems at this time. PHM should still be
researched as a viable option for future production aircraft.
D. SMART WIRE
Smart Wire is as close to true PHM as we can get. However, implementing Smart
Wire into existing platforms basically means re-wiring the aircraft. Therefore, the
implementation of Smart Wire would be very costly, intrusive, time consuming and
difficult to install. The intrusive nature of installation alone could cause other problems.
Only a partial installation of Smart Wire could also be a poor decision if interoperability
difficulties and logistical concerns are not addressed. Once again, Smart Wire may be
best for future production aircraft.
E. ARC FAULT CIRCUIT BREAKER
Arc Fault Circuit Breaker (AFCB) can be a powerful deterrent to improve safety.
Once miniaturized, the installation ofAFCB should be much easier than that of Smart
Wire. However, AFCB deals with power wires only, which comprise roughly 20% of all
wiring. This wiring does present the greatest danger though.
"'Sean A. Field, Naval Air Systems Command, e-mail to the author, 17 November 2000.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
Aging aircraft wiring presents a dangerous and complicated problem for Naval
Aviation. Aircraft are being utilized long beyond their intended life and as each year
passes, more complications due to aging become apparent. The aging problem will not
go away as new aircraft are few and far between.
Aviation technicians and maintenance decision-makers need the correct tools and
practices to combat the aging wire dilemma. This thesis presents some possible options
for addressing the aging wire problem.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Arc Fault Circuit Breakers (AFCB) and Standing Wave Reflectometers
(SWR) provide the most viable options for investment at this time.
AFCB would be less intrusive to install than Smart Wire and addresses a key
safety concern of arcing in aircraft power distribution systems. Standing Wave
Reflectometers (SWR) represent a leap forward in being able to prosecute wiring faults in
a faster and more effective manner. SWR technology is expandable and relatively
inexpensive at $5,500 each. Current troubleshooting methods utilizing human senses,
flashlights, and voltmeters are not enough to combat the aging wiring problem.
Prosecution of wiring faults can take anywhere from hours to days. Wiring fault
prosecution can be reduced to minutes with SWR. SWRs put the right tool in the right
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hands: the flight-line maintainer. Hard faults can be detected and localized with precise
accuracy with SWR. For legacy systems, AFCB and SWR are the answer. As a mattei
of fact, one major airline has recently ordered SWR units to help maintain their fleet of
aircraft.
2. Smart Wire and PHM are not the complete answer at this time for legacy
systems.
PHM and Smart Wire are great concepts. However, they consist of re-wiring an
aircraft. Given the amount of wiring in modern aircraft and fiscal constraints, this
installation would be highly intrusive, labor intensive, time consuming and costly.
However, given the thorough nature of major depot maintenance and efforts such as
Service Life Extension Programs, perhaps Smart Wire and future PHM technology could
be inserted in recognized problem areas. The cost effectiveness of this insertion should
be studied and coupled with Reliability Centered Maintenance and trend analysis. The
requisite logistical ramifications should also be studied such as interoperability demands,
training and supply support.
3. Establishing time limits for aircraft is a must.
At some point it needs to be decided that the Band-Aid type efforts such as
modification, refurbishment and SLEPs can be more trouble than a new platform. The
cost ramifications of aging systems are just recently being understood. New and current
aircraft must have an established time limit for termination. This time limit could be
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modified by periodic reviews of the aircraft's condition as it ages. This hard limit could
also act as an indicator for replacement planning.
4. Training to deal with aging systems is paramount.
Correct training in regards to wire inspections, troubleshooting, repair and the
fragile nature of wiring and upkeep is an absolute must. Today's flight line and
intermediate level technicians are younger, but more technologically savvy and they must
be properly trained and provided the correct tools. Given today's operational tempos and
multiple demands, training is often put on the back burner. This trend has to stop.
5. An accurate wire discrepancy data collection system needs to be
established.
This can be accomplished with a distinct traceable sub-classification code, which
could assist in trend analysis and hazard identification. Appropriate training should be
also initiated to properly instruct personnel on how and when to use this sub-
classification code.
6. Recent efforts by multiple government agencies, departments, industries
and academia in regards to aging systems are beneficial.
The aging problem will only get worse, as fewer costly new systems come on
line. Joint efforts provide the pooling of ideas, resources and clout. This coordinated
effort to maintain aging systems must continue.
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C. FINAL REMARKS
The contributions of this thesis to NAVAIR's pursuit of a solution to deal with
aging aircraft wiring are:
-An overview of the aging aircraft wiring problem
-Presentation of emerging technologies such as PHM, Smart Wire, AFCB and
SWR.
-A presentation of possible cost savings of emerging diagnostic technology using
simple models in areas which are very difficult for the Navy to express,
specifically, labor savings in terms of time and dollars, and ramifications of
unavailable aircraft in dollars.
-A collection of information, resources and references that act as an enabler to
bring analysts, decision-makers and information from various departments and
agencies together that may not have been known to each other previously.
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APPENDIX A. T-45 WIRE DEGRADERS 01JUN99 - 30JUN00
41
wuc NOMENCLATURE TOTAL NMC NMCMl
428A6 FUEL QUANTITY INDICATION ACFT WIRING 3355.8 2761
42823 NOSE WHEEL STEERING ACFT WIRING 1821.7 1380.2
4287C DC GENERATION/CONTROL ACFT WIRING 1330.2 812.8
428K1 RADAR ALTIMETER ACFT WIRING 1100.4 217.6
428C3 CAUTION WARNING SYS (CWS) 755.6 755.6
428H1 IFF SYSTEM ACFT WIRING 749.1 5.1
42833 YAW DAMPER ACFT WIRING 531.3 512.5
42827 WEIGHT ON WHEELS (WOW) ACFT WIRING 529.9 353.6
42884 HYD PRESSURE INDICATION ACFT WIRING 371.4 371.4
428A0 FUEL SYS 281.7 271.4
428E2 ANGLE OF ATTACK (AOA) ACFT WIRING 155.3 155.3
428J
1
TACAN ACFT WIRING 148.7 148.7
428G0 INTERPHONE SYSTEM 136.7 136.7
42851 ENGINE CONTROL/INDICATION ACFT WIRING 80.1 80.1
42821 LDG GEAR EXT/RETRACTION ACFT WIRING 58.7 58.7
428A8 FUEL FLOW INDICATION ACFT WIRING 50.6 29.1
42826 LDG GEAR POSN INDICATION ACFT WIRING 41.5 41.5
4283L SPEED BRAKE CONTROL ACFT WIRING 44.8 44.8
42822 ANTI-SKID SYSTEM ACFT WIRING 34.2 34.2
428F2 UHFA/HF #1 , #2 ACFT WIRING 25.8 25.8
4287D DC POWER DISTRIBUTION ACFT WIRING 28.3 28.3
42850 POWERPLANT INSTALLATION SYSTEM 27.3 27.3
4287E 5 VDC INTERIOR LIGHTING ACFT WIRING 22.1 22.1
428A4 FUEL SYS DISTR/CONTROL ACFT WIRING 18 18
4287A AC GENERATION/CONTROL ACFT WIRING 17.2 17.2
428A7 FUEL PRESS IND/LL WARNING ACFT WIRING 15.5 15.5
428R1 FWD & AFT EJECTION SEAT ACFT WIRING 15.2 15.2
4283H FLAT/SLAT CONT & STBY CONT ACFT WIRING 13.5 12
42861 CABIN PRESSURE CONTROL ACFT WIRING 11.1 11.1
428C2 JET PIPE OVERHEAT DETECTION ACFT WIRING 9.5 9.5
428G2 COMMUNICATION/NAVIGATION XFR ACFT WIRING 8.2 8.2
428E3 AIRBORNE DATA RCVR AYA (ADRS) ACFT WIRING 7.8 7.8
42833 SPEED BRAKE POSN INDICATION ACFT WIRING 7.4 7.4
42852 ENGINE STARTING ACFT WIRING 7.4 7.4
428K0 RADAR NAVIGATION SYSTEM 5.6 5.6
428B1 ON BOARD OXYGEN SYSTEM ACFT WIRING 5.1 5.1
4283E STAB TRIM CONT/STBY CONT ACFT WIRING 4.9 4.9
4283C RUDDER TRIM CONTROL ACFT WIRING 3.4 3.4
42825 ARRESTING GEAR ACFT WIRING 3.3 3.3
42829 NOC 2.4 2.4
428F0 UHFA/HF COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 2 2
4283G STAB TRIM POSN INDICATION ACFT WIRING 1.8 1.8
42824 LAUNCH BAR ACFT WIRING 1.6 1.6
42883 HYD FAILURE WARNING ACFT WIRING 1.5 1.5
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428EA MUX BUS (1 553B) SYS ACFT WIRING 1.5 1.5
428J0 RADIO NAVIGATION SYSEM 1.4 1.4
42863 CABIN PRESSURE WARNING ACFT WIRING 1 1
4283K FLAP POSITION INDICATION ACFT WIRING 1 1
428D0 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM 0.9 0.9
4287N 28 VDC FLOOD LIGHTING ACFT WIRING 0.9 0.9
428E1 STD ATTD HDG/REF SYS (SAHRS) ACFT WIRING 0.7 0.7
4287B AC POWER DISTRIBUTION ACFT WIRING 0.6 0.6
428D5 PITOT STATIC &AOA HEAT ACFT WIRING 0.5 0.5
428E0 FLIGHT REFERENCE SYSTEM 0.2 0.2
TOTAL HOURS 11852.3 8443.4
NMC data from 515 report dated 13 SEP 2000
Verified by updated 515 report dated 09 NOV 2000
From: T-45 FST, NADEP JAX, 2000
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APPENDIX B. F/A-18 WIRE DEGRADERS DECEMBER '98-MAY '00
45
Nomenclature DMMH NMCM NMCS PMCM PMCS
NOC 72 C C
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 85
LOWER LEG GARTER 10 12
EQUIPMENT BAY ACCESS COVER NO. 124 82 1
CANOPY RELEASE ASSEMBLY 22 38 146
R2236/ALQ165 COUNTERMEASURES RCVR 83 20 130
NOC 25
YELLOW ELECTRICAL CABLE W5 33 3,546 926
AN/ASD10(V) ADVANCED TAC AIR RECON S 82
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 81 2,824 99
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND]
SPECIAL CABLE ASSEMBLY W6021
1
77 5 2 159 5,649
WARM AIR TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE 67 350 109
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 73 7
MX1 1598/AAS46 AFT SECTION POD 61 802 56 22 29
COMPRESSOR VG CONTROL ACTUATOR ASSY 53 874 145
NOC 78 31 2
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 78
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 38 4,479 817
NOC 67 1
FUEL DUMP CONTROL ASSEMBLY 80 28 2
SMS CABLE ASSEMBLY W53032 64
NAVAIR DWG 841AS425-1395 SMDC (MU69) 79 6
T1599/AST8 AIR DATA PRESS TRANSMITTE 82 1,001 905
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 23 2,295
Y679.850 OUTBOARD FAIRING 45 2
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 113
FLIGHT CONTROL CABLE ASSY W53303 79 157 11
NOC 49 5
SHROUD 41 153 105
SMS CABLE ASSEMBLY W53037 70 21 136
NOC 23 20
ACFT FIRE DETECTION WRN SYS CONT UNI 37 27
NOC 29 457
FLT CONT SPECIAL CABLE ASSY W60206 77 45
ELECTRICAL CABLE ASSEMBLY W55219 69 17 6
LOW PRESSURE TURBINE MODULE 110
F/A-18E & F ACFT MTD ACCESS DRIVE SY 76 774
CP2414/A DIGITAL MAP COMPUTER 76 73 55
HORIZ STAB SPINDLE ACCESS COVER NO. 77
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 70 3
CENTER FUSELAGE WIRING SYSTEM 56 728 3 1,164
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 28
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 60 48| 12
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NAVAIR DWG 841AS425-1391 SMDC (MU68) 75 4 C C
AS3492/AST4(V) ANTENNA 37 C C 745 1
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 32 C c 71C
R2237/ALQ165 COUNTERMEASURES RCVR 74 4 c 171 342
ACFT FIXED LANDING LIGHT 38 a 614 4 72
CABLE ASSEMBLY W52203 60 c 27 3
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND]
AFTERBURNER MODULE 87 6
HARNESS ASSEMBLY 27
OIL COOLER 65 27 184
WINDSHIELD INSTALLATION 68 1,466
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 17 2
NOC 39 26 152
NOC 59 7
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 72
FLIGHT CONTROL CABLE ASSY W53302 71 530 7
MECHANICAL INSTALLATION 53 4,243 1,032
CARTRIDGE-ACTUATED DEVICE (CONTD) 70 8,188
WAVEGUIDE FLUID PRESS REGULATING VAL 28 209 1,551
CU2264/A MID/LOW BAND COUPLER 11
PRIMARY VARIABLE EXHAUST NOZ FLAP 24 10 23
_g
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 96 160 124
INFLIGHT REFUELING SYSTEM 15 9 521
NOC 68 867 121
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 12
SHUTOFF VALVE 35 312 2
BACK PLATE ASSEMBLY 30 4
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 6 7
HARPOON CABLE ASSEMBLY W56236 4
PORT GENERATOR CONTROL UNIT 73 798 506
NOC 24 3,591 2,371
EXTERNAL TANK LIQUID QUANTITY XMTR 33 682 197
CABLE ASSEMBLY W50303 59 405 263
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 84
AS3493/AST4(V) ANTENNA 19 925 207
ARRESTING HOOK ACTUATING CYL ASSY 50 1,466 2,952
NOC 68 3 123
NAVAIR DWG 841AS425-1403 SMDC (MU72) 67 6
LOWER FUEL-COMBUSTOR MANIFOLD 13 2 8
NOC 36 1,609 127
NAVAIR DWG 841AS425-1113 SMDC (MG88) 68
NOC 4
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 69 3,201 268
330 GAL EXTERNAL FUEL SYSTEM 66 1
FWD UPR INLET DUCT (BETW Y453 & Y524 67
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CCU72/A UNLATCH THRUSTER CRTG (XW58) 66 12,261
NOC 53
RESERVOIR HYDRAULIC FLUID MANIFOLD 50 3,986 49
ELECTRIAL EQUIPMENT RACK (ALQ165) 66
NOC 55 720
LOW PRESSURE TURBINE NOZZLE AIR SEAL 69
NOC 65 3 3
NOC 50
NAVAIR DWG 841AS425-1397 SMDC (MU70) 65. 4
DATA LINK CABLE ASSEMBLY W50102 64j 983 5
AN/DPT1 RADAR TRANSMITTING SET 65, 11
NOC 60 15 887
CABLE ASSEMBLY W60222 52 '
NOC 50 159 179
AIRCRAFT-MISSILE FAIRING NO. 120 65 15
SPECIAL CABLE ASSEMBLY W60212 58 8
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 72 1 3
NOC 46 3 66
AFT FUSELAGE (CONTD) 54 537 95
NAVAIR DWG 841AS425-1 109 SMDC (MG86) 65
_^
COMPRESSOR INLET PRESSURE SENSOR 8 2,226 5,004
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND]
SPECIAL CABLE ASSEMBLY W60232 61 136 2 3
FLIGHT CONTROL CABLE ASSY W60250 63 16
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 58 40 29
ENVIROMENTAL CONT CABLE ASSY W61222 59 221 745
NOC 20 .
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 3
OUTBOARD LEADING EDGE FLAP 62 745 2,762
NAVAIR DWG 841AS425-1119 SMDC (MG91) 64
AS4358/A ANTENNA 69 298 135 1
RUDDER SYSTEM 62 50
STANDBY INSTRUMENT CABLE ASSY W50323 60 142
AIRCRAFT INTERFACE UNIT F-18 62 20 762
OH59(V)/AST4(V) POD GP SIM SET 57
SHORT MAIN AFTERBURNER SPRAYBAR 61 32
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 88
NOC 35 96
TE FLAP ACTUATOR ACCESS COVER NO. 78 54 783 769
CD62/ALR67(V) DISTRIBUTION CONTROL 31
AVIONICS EMERGENCY RAM AIR SCOOP 55 432
NAVAIR DWG 850AS875-135 (SP19) 62
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 67 1 ol
FORWARD FUSELAGE SECTION 61 364 \i
AUXILARY SCOOP 49 169 509|
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NAVAIR DWG 841AS425-1117 SMDC (MG90) 62
GRAY ELECTRICAL CABLE W3 25 95 193
NLG DOOR UPLOCK HOOK 43 184 71
AS4440/APX1 1 1 (V) ANTENNA 19 1
CABLE ASSEMBLY W53214 59
NOC 27
DIVERTER VALVE PUSH-PULL CONTROL ASS 36
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 9 2
A/P22P-16 AIRCREW PROTECTIVE ASSEMBL 14
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND]
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND]
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 59
UNIVERSAL JOINT 60 8,120 86
NOC 58
—9
NAVAIR DWG 850AS875-107 (SP05) 59
NOC 12 1
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 33
ARRESTING HOOK STRL CMPNT PYLON SPRT 43
NOC 33 27 117
COMMUNICATION CABLE ASSEMBLY W52006 58 20 8
ACCESS COVER NO. 107 42
AFTERBURNER LINER 78
AN/ASW44 SYSTEM AIRCRAFT WIRING 55 122 176
AFT FUSELAGE (CONTD) 49
EMER BRAKE/LDG GR COUPLER ASSEMBLY 32 2,317
SMS CABLE ASSEMBLY W50210 13 4 73
ARRESTING HOOK CABLE ASSY W61220 29 17
F/A-18E & F PWR PLANT CONTROL SYSTEM 56 23
RH CONSOLE 39
NOC 42 3 10
GUN GAS PURGE DR LIN ACTG CYL ASSY 31 21 20
EXTERIOR LIGHTING 54
ELECTRICAL CABLE ASSEMBLY W55218 59 60 1
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 67
MISCELLANEOUS WIRING SYSTEMS 55 4 62
[WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 4
MX11627/AST6(V) ELEK CMPNT SHLD POD 53 22 20
ELECTRIC CABLE ASSEMBLY W60034 36 7 1,311
OUTBD LEF LOWER FAIRING NO. 476 53 609
TOTAL 8,771 79,222 24,502 9,569 10,708
From: Katzberg, 2000
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APPENDIX C. EA-6B WIRE DEGRADERS DECEMBER '98-MAY '00
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wuc Nomenclature DMMH NMCM NMCS PMCM
42800 HYDRAULIC TUBING/HOSE 641 2,563 105
42820 NLG HYDRAULIC COMPONENTS 621 5,531 2,081
42829 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 331 2 4 898
42830 EXTENSIBLE EQPT PLATFORM SYSTEM 618 3,282 697 9
42831 NOC 511 2,067 568
42832 C7949( )/ARA63( ) RECEIVER CONTROL 483 2,794 9
42839 CPK113/A37J2 POWER TRIM COMPUTER 422
42840 AOA/STALL WARNING SYSTEM 564 213 285 96
42843 WING TIP 619 1 10
42844 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 272
42845 KEEL F.S. 293 TO 368 .472 . 478 650
42846 TURN/SLIP/BANK INDICATOR 141 24 10 143 73
42847 POWER CONTROL RELAY BOX 343 2,585 2,354 2,482 1,593
42848 FLIGHT HYDRAULIC POWER SYSTEM 549 564 1,020
42849 SPEED BRAKE POSITION TRANSMITTER 634 832 168 302 17
42850 CV2702/A A TO D CONVERTER 150 4,764 442 5 55
42851 MX3162/ASW16 AIRCRAFT CONTROL STICK 502 2,753 1,076 7 599
42852 ARRESTING HOOK DASHPOT 562 6,485 1,178
42858 NOC 314 692 375
42859 FLAP CONTROL OFFSET GEARBOX 163 766 308
_q
42860 MLG DOWN AND LOCK SWITCHES 549 2,261 228
42861 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 17 2 5
42862 FF ANTENNA 267 18 39 374 1,589
42865 COCKPIT EQUIPMENT 499 125
42866 ID2121( )/ARC FREQUENCY CHANNEL IND 492 947 3 826 296
42867 IFF/SIF SYSTEMS AIRCRAFT WIRING 480 175 157 291 211
42868 EQUIPMENT COOLING VALVE 336 915 307 2 7
42869 VHF COMMUNICATIONS SYS ACFT WIRING 579 3,204 268
42870 RUDDER CONTROL HYDRAULIC 549 1,667 739
42872 CANOPY JETTISON VALVE 400 534 191
42873 LIFT/SPEED CONTROL SURFACES 373 560 3
42874 RADAR NAVIGATION SYS ACFT WIRING 572 41 718 23
42877 NOC 270 1,455 4,930 586
42879 MT6126/ALQ99F(V) ELECTRICAL EQPT RAC 558 137 866 18
42880 BULKHEAD 427 713 6
42884 RATE SWITCHING GYROSCOPE 191 2,714 142 33 12
42885 C9871/ARC RADIO SET CONTROL 313N-5 595 116 638 2,051 4,869
42886 AIR COND/PRESSURIZATION/ICE CONTROL 372 644 20
42887 NOC 207 1,052 1,718
42888 SA2157/ARC SWITCHING UNIT 156 310 8 82
42889 NOC 534 3,056 188
42890 [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 5
42899 R1844/ALQ99( )(V) CM RECEIVER 68 3
428- TSEC/KY58 SIDE MOUNT ADAPTER 69 4 80 128
52
4282- STEERING HYDRAULIC COMPONENTS 50 8 2
4282K NOC 57
4282L ARRESTING HOOK POSITION SWITCH 59 27
4284- NOC 54 6
4284A AN/ALQ99( )(V) CM SET OR41(
)
57
4284S VERTICAL STABILIZER FAIRING 59 31
4284T TYPE KJ4 CMPS TRANSMITTER 40 2 26
4284U ROCKET FIRING UNIT 44 203 54
4284V OXYGEN PANEL 29
4284WNOC 51 7
4284X FUSELAGE MATING FITTING 58 312
4284Y ANTI ICE VALVE 57 161
4284Z WING FOLD SEAL 57
_g 2 174
4285- WINGFOLD HYDRAULIC 57 245
4285A SLAT CONTROL SWITCH 56 13
4285B FILTER MODULE 57 22
4285L WINGFOLD ELECTRICAL 55
4285M EXT POWER RECEPTACLE LIGHT 55 1
4285N [WUC NOMENCLATURE NOT FOUND] 57 142
4286- NOSE WHEEL WELL CURTAIN INSTALLATION 55 1,465
4287A LANDING GEAR CONTROL MECHANICAL 55 69 71
4287B NOC 57 1 731 1
4287C POWER BRAKE VALVE 40 1 44
4287D ABU4( )/A ACCELEROMETER 2
4287E DIRECTIONAL CONTROL SYSTEM
4288A NOC 37 2 22
4289B PRESS R BLEED CONT SPRT ASSY(P6/8/40 29 1 11 22
4289C NOC 51 2
4289D DHK8/A24J-25(V) FUEL TANK SENSING UN 26
428A1 NOC 74 6,340 144
428A9 PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT 54 440
TOTAL 18,966 51,048 15,713 30,451 12,158
From: Katzberg, 2000
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2. AFCB - ARC FAULT CIRCUIT BREAKER
3. ASTF - AGING SYSTEMS TASK FORCE
4. AVDLR - AVIATION DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLE
5. AWIGG - AIRCRAFT WIRING & INERT GAS GENERATOR
6. BA- BILLETS AUTHORIZED
7. BIT -BUILT IN TEST
8. BuNo- BUREAU NUMBER
9. CBM - CONDITION BASED MAINTENANCE
10. CNO - CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
1 1
.
DARPA - DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
12. DOD - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
13. FAA - FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
14. FY -FISCAL YEAR
15. IPT - INTEGRATED PROCESS TEAM
16. JDIS - JOINT DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION SYSTEM
17. JSF - JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER
18. LRU - LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT
19. MEOS - MICRO ELECTRO-OPTICAL SYSTEM
20. MEMS - MICRO ELECTRO-MECHANICAL SYSTEM
21. MMH - MAINTENANCE MAN HOURS
22. NASA - NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
23. NAVAIR - NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND
24. NAVSEA - NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND
25. NAVWAG - NAVAL AIR VEHICLE WIRING ACTION GROUP
26. NMC -NON-MISSION CAPABLE
27. NMCM - NON-MISSION CAPABLE MAINTENANCE
28. NMCS - NON-MISSION CAPABLE SUPPLY
29. NMCMU - NON-MISSION CAPABLE MAINTENANCE UNSCHEDULED
30. NTSB - NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION & SAFETY BOARD
3 1
.
O&M, N - OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE NAVY
32. ONR - OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH
33. OS & TP - OFFICE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY POLICY
34. PHM - PROGNOSTIC HEALTH MAINTENANCE
35. PMC - PARTIAL MISSION CAPABLE
36. PMCM - PARTIAL MISSION CAPABLE MAINTENANCE
37. PMCMU - PARTIAL MISSION CAPABLE MAINTENANCE
UNSCHEDULED
38. PMCS - PARTIAL MISSION CAPABLE SUPPLY
39. SLEP - SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM




TDR - TIME DOMAIN REFLECTOMETRY
42. USAF - UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
43. WSSIWG - WIRE SYSTEM SAFETY INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP
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1. DIAGNOSTICS - Identification by examination or analysis.
2. IMPEDANCE - A measure of the total opposition to current flow in an
alternating current circuit.
3. PROGNOSTICS - Prediction on the basis of present indications.
4. SPECTRA - Plural of spectrum
5. SPECTROSCOPE - Any of various instruments for resolving and observing or
recording spectra.
6. SPECTRUM - The distribution of a characteristic of a physical system or
phenomenon, especially the distribution of energy emitted by a radiant source
arranged in order of wavelengths.
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